The Marital Fourth and the Widow\u27s Homestead by Gladney, Charles G.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 25 | Number 1
Symposium Issue: Louisiana Legislation of 1964
December 1964
The Marital Fourth and the Widow's Homestead
Charles G. Gladney
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Charles G. Gladney, The Marital Fourth and the Widow's Homestead, 25 La. L. Rev. (1964)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol25/iss1/24
COMMENTS
It seems that a community terminated by any mode other
than separation from bed and board cannot be re-established
by authentic act. The language of the re-establishment article,
"upon reconciliation of the parties,' 117 definitely applies to a
separation from bed and board, and it seems unlikely that this
language could be interpreted to mean that a couple who had
been-divorced and remarried could re-establish the community
from the date of the suit for divorce. It is remotely possible
that the language could be interpreted to allow re-establishment
by authentic act of a community terminated by absence. How-
ever, on return of the absentee spouse, the marital community
probably is re-established by operation of law, as the Code pro-
vides termination of provisional possession in such circum-
stances. Can a community terminated by the wife's successful
action for separation of property be re-established by authentic
act? It is certainly possible that the financial condition of the
husband which provoked the suit may be cured, but the "recon-
ciliation" language of the article seems to make it wholly in-
applicable. The action for separation of property is not
prompted by an estrangement of the spouses, but only by the
peril of the financial interest of the wife; thus a real "reconcilia-
tion" is impossible. If re-establishment is desirable in such
situation, further legislation seems necessary.
Charles A. Snyder
THE MARITAL FOURTH AND THE
WIDOW'S HOMESTEAD
The community property system provides a measure of fi-
nancial security to the surviving spouse on the death of the
other by dividing the community estate into equal shares for the
patrimony of each spouse. Such security is insufficient if the
community is small or insolvent; hence the lawmaker has pro-
vided additional benefits.' Two of these benefits are the widow's
117. Id. art. 155, as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 178.
1. These benefits are: the inheritance of the surviving spouse, provided by
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 915 (1870) ; the usufruct of the surviving spouse, provided
by id. art. 916; the marital fourth, provided by id. art. 2382; the widow's home-
stead, provided by id. art. 3252.
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homestead 2 and the marital fourth.8  The widow's homestead,
first introduced by Act 255 of 18524 and later incorporated into
the Louisiana Civil Code as article 3252, provides that a widow
or minor children in necessitous circumstances may claim by
preferential right the sum of one thousand dollars from the suc-
cession of the deceased husband or father. 5 On the other hand
the marital fourth (article 2382) allows the surviving spouse to
obtain, under certain conditions, one-fourth of the deceased
spouse's succession.6
Until recently the substance of the two articles was thought
so similar that the courts construed them as being pari ma-
teria.7 Renunciation of this premise8 requires a clear delinea-
tion of the distinction between the two articles and necessitates
the provision of some guidelines for future cases.
2. LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 3252 (1870) : "Whenever the widow or minor children
of a deceased person shall be left in necessitous circumstances, and not possess
in their own rights property to the amount of One Thousand Dollars, the widow
or the legal representatives of the children, shall be entitled to demand and
receive from the succession of the deceased husband or father, a sum which
added to the amount of property owned by them, or either of them, in their
own right, will make up the sum of one thousand dollars and which amount
shall be paid in preference to all other debts, except those secured by the
vendor's privilege on both movables and immovables, conventional mortgages,
and expenses incurred in selling the property. The surviving widow shall have
and enjoy the usufruct of the amount so received from her deceased husband's
succession, during her widowhood, which amount shall afterwards vest in and
belong to the children or other descendants of the deceased husband."
3. Id. art. 2382 (1870): "When the wife has not brought any dowry, or
when what she brought as a dowry is inconsiderable with respect to the condi-
tion of the husband, if either the husband or the wife die rich, leaving the
survivor in necessitous circumstances, the latter has a right to take out of the
succession of the deceased what is called the marital portion; that is, the fourth
of the succession in full property, if there be no children, and the same portion,
in usufruct only, when there are but three or a smaller number of children;
and if there be more than three children, the surviving, whether husband or
wife, shall receive only a child's share in usufruct, and he is bound to include
in this portion what has been left to him as a legacy by the husband or wife,
who died first.
"Whenever, during the administration of any succession it appears that the
surviving spouse will be entitled to the marital portion above provided for, upon
final liquidation of the estate of the deceased, the survivor in necessitous cir-
cumstances shall be entitled to demand and receive from the executor or admin-
istrator of such succession, a periodical allowance to be fixed by the court wherein
the proceedings are pending. Such allowance shall be based upon the apparent
amount of the marital portion invested at five per cent. per annum interest.
And should the marital portion, as finally fixed, not yield the revenue equal to
the allowance as fixed by the court, the surviving spouse shall be charged with,
and there shall be deducted from the martial portion, the amount of such de-
ficiency. The provisions of this article shall apply to successions pending and
unsettled, as well as those hereafter opened."
4. La. Acts 1852, No. 255.
5. See note 2 supra.
6. See note 3 supra.
7. Veillon v. Lafleur's Estate, 162 La. 214, 110 So. 326 (1926) ; Wimprenne
v. Jouty, 12 La. App. 326, 125 So. 154 (Orl. Cir. 1929).
8. Malone v. Cannon, 215 La. 939, 41 So. 2d 837 (1949).
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THE MARITAL FOURTH AND THE WIDOW'S HOMESTEAD
ARE NOT LAWS IN PARI MATERIA
Until the decision in Malone v. Cannon9 the courts, in read-
ing the two articles together, sometimes reached unfortunate
conclusions. 10 The Supreme Court, in a well-reasoned opinion,
concluded that the articles were not in pari materia for the fol-
lowing reasons: First, the purposes of the two articles are dis-
similar. The marital fourth was premised on the existence of a
marriage, both in law and fact, and the discharge of the mutual
marital duties defined in articles 119 1 and 12012 of the Louisi-
an Civil Code; the widow's homestead was enacted as a welfare
measure to prevent the surviving widow and minor children
from becoming wards of the state. Second, the marital fourth
is unlimited in amount except on the required fractional basis;
the widow's homestead is limited to a maximum of one thousand
dollars. Third, both the husband and wife may seek the marital
portion; only the widow or minor children may claim the
widow's homestead. Fourth, "necessitous circumstances" as
used in connection with the marital fourth is a relative term;
the widow's homestead can be claimed only when the widow's
and minor children's assets do not exceed one thousand dollars.
Fifth, the widow's homestead may be awarded from insolvent
as well as solvent estates; the marital fourth is obtainable only
from solvent estates. Sixth, the two articles were derived from
different sources: the marital fourth has roots in Roman law;
the widow's homestead had its inception in a legislative act of
1852.13
In light of Malone, in which the court reached a sound con-
clusion, much confusion can be eliminated by careful analysis
of the prior jurisprudence. To assist us, it should be determined
9. 215 La. 939, 41 So. 2d 837 (1949).
10. See, e.g., Wimprenne v. Jouty, 12 La. App. 326, 125 So. 154 (Orl. Cir.
1929), in which the bride, some two weeks after the marriage, abandoned her
husband and did not reappear until she came into court seeking the marital
fourth. The court of appeal, although sympathetic toward the husband's heirs,
allowed the marital fourth under the literal interpretation rule discussed at note
61 infra, and accompanying text.
11. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 119 (1870) : "The husband and wife owe to each
other mutually, fidelity, support and assistance."
12. Id. art. 120: "The wife is bound to live with her husband and to follow
him whereever he chooses to reside; the husband is obliged to receive her and
to furnish her with whatever is required for the convenience of life, in por-
portion to his means and condition."
13. Malone v. Cannon, 215 La. 939, 962-64, 41 So. 2d 837, 843-45 (1949).
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whether the case was decided at a time when the two articles
were considered in pari materia, and whether the decision was
sound in light of the purpose of the article in question.
THE WIDOW'S HOMESTEAD
The widow's homestead statute provides that a widow or
minor children in necessitous circumstances may claim by pref-
erential right the sum of one thousand dollars from the succes-
sion of the deceased husband or father. 14 This provision, al-
though found in the section of the Code dealing with privileges,
does not appear to be an ordinary privilege. As the succession
is made the debtor,' 5 the privilege seems to be more in the na-
ture of an inheritance right, and as such might have been placed
more properly in the section on successions. This provision has
the welfare motive of keeping the widow and children in neces-
sitous circumstances from being forced to look to public funds
for support.16 The legislature, so motivated, chose to adopt the
mode of a privilege to insure that the widow and children would
prime most succession creditors. 7 Consideration of this pur-
pose suggests that the courts are not compelled to adhere liter-
ally to the stricti juris principle, which requires the courts to
interpret a privilege narrowly, 8 nor to the general principle
that a privilege is an accessory of a valid debt.19
An examination of the jurisprudence, however, discloses
that the courts have subordinated the purpose of the widow's
homestead to the stricti juris principle. The courts, for example,
in interpreting whose succession is meant by the words "suc-
cession of the deceased husband or father" have considered
claims against the grandfather's succession, 20 the grandmother's
succession, 21 and the mother's succession.2 2 Only in the last case,
14. LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 3252 (1870). See note 2 supra.
15. Id. art. 3252: "[Tlhe widow or the legal representatives of the children,
shall be entitled to demand and receive from the succession of the deceased hus-
band or father . . ."
16. Malone v. Cannon, 215 La. 939, 961, 41 So. 2d 837, 844 (1949).
17. Article 3252, by its terms, provides that this privilege shall be ranked by
the vendor's privilege on movables and immovables, conventional mortgages, and
expenses incurred in selling the property.
18. LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 3185 (1870) : "Privilege can be claimed only for
those debts to which it is expressly granted in this code."
19. Washington v. Washington, 241 La. 35, 62, 127 So. 2d 491, 500 (1961).
20. Succession of Watzke, 139 La. 868, 72 So. 423 (1916).
21. Succession of Geisler, 32 La. Ann. 1289 (1880).
22. Succession of Edwards, 32 La. Ann. 457 (1880) ; Succession of Coleman,
27 La. Ann. 289 (1875).
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now overruled, has the court refused to apply the stricti juris
principle and thus allowed the claim.23 In the other cases, the
courts, apparently adhering to the stricti juris principle, have
rested their decisions on a literal construction of the article.
The "necessitous circumstances" requirement of the widow's
homestead is different from the "necessitous circumstances"
requirement of the marital fourth. Under the latter the sur-
viving spouse must prove only that his or her wealth is "rela-
tively small" when compared with that of the deceased spouse,
and, unlike the former, there is no limitation of one thousand
dollars. 24 The courts have refused to consider such factors as
the widow's ability to work, or that she is working, 2 , in deter-
mining whether she is entitled to the homestead. These de-
cisions appear correct, given the purpose of the widow's home-
stead. To do otherwise would make the award depend upon
chance or circumstance and would not properly reflect the lib-
erality sought to be afforded by the lawmaker.
Unfortunately, however, the courts have subordinated the
purpose behind the privilege to the principle of stricti juris in
determining what deductions should be made in computing the
amount to be awarded to the widow and minor children. Deduc-
tions have been allowed for insurance proceeds that the wife re-
ceives as beneficiary ;26 rent received by the widow after the
death of her husband ;27 money received by the widow and chil-
dren from benevolent societies.2 Even the furniture and bed-
ding belonging to the widow and children have been consid-
ered.29 It appears that deductions for insurance proceeds and
money received from benevolent societies are proper; however,
the other deductions appear to be examples of an unduly strin-
gent use of the stricti juris principle. Although the tenor of the
article is that the courts should award the widow and children
only the difference between the amount of their property and
23. Succession of Coleman, 27 La. Ann. 289 (1875), result overruled, Sue-
cession of Geisler, 32 La. Ann. 1289 (1880).
24. Malone v. Cannon, 215 La. 939, 960-61, 41 So. 2d 837, 844 (1949).
25. Succession of Kuntz, 179 So. 623 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938) ; Succession
of Hawk, 9 La. App. 211, 120 So. 93 (2d Cir. 1932).
26. Succession of Farrell, 200 La. 29, 7 So. 2d 605 (1942) ; Succession bf
Roach, 155 La. 541, 99 So. 442 (1924) ; Succession of Fatjo, 52 La. Ann. 1561,
28 So. 135 (1900) ; Succession of DeBoisblane, 32 La. Ann. 17 (1880).
27. Coyle v. Succession of Creevy, 34 La. Ann. 539 (1882); Succession of
Drum, 26 La. Ann. 539 (1874).
28. Succession of Wellmeyer, 34 La. Ann. 819 (1882).
29. Succession of Drum, 26 La. Ann. 539 (1.874) ; Sarat v. L'Hote, 2 McGloin
29 (La. App. 1884).
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the sum of one thousand dollars, it is unlikely that the lawmaker
intended the courts to be so stringent in determining the assets
of the widow and minor children. The courts should adopt a
more liberal approach, and thus fulfill the welfare purpose of
the widow's homestead.
Several questions revolving around the term "children"30
have faced the courts: first, what children are entitled to de-
mand the widow's homestead from the succession? Second, are
the assets of minor children by a former marriage combined
with those of the widow or minor children of a second marriage
in determining whether widow's homestead benefits are avail-
able? Third, which persons are entitled to the proceeds of the
homestead after the death of the widow-usufructuary?
In the first situation the courts quickly disposed of claims
of major children for the homestead when the widow failed to
demand it, stating that the law contemplates only the demands
of the widow or minor children. Competing claims of minor
children of two marriages present a more serious problem. This
situation was apparently not contemplated by the legislature,
as the law gives only one homestead.3 1 The only solution, per-
haps, is to divide the proceeds equally among all the claimants.
8 2
The courts have answered the second question by constru-
ing article 3252 to mean that the assets of all the minor chil-
dren and the widow must be added to determine whether the
homestead may be given." It was reasoned that since the ar-
ticle provides for only one homestead, to exclude the assets of
some minor children, such as those by a former marriage, would
unduly penalize succession creditors. This reasoning, however,
overlooks the purpose of the privilege. As the widow's home-
stead has not been awarded from this succession, and since there
are persons who would properly benefit by its award, it seems
30. Succession of Vives, 35 La. Ann. 371 (1883) ; Succession of Durkin, 30
La. Ann. 669 (1878).
31. See Stewart v. Stewart, 13 La. Ann. 398 (1858).
32. Possible argument against this solution could arise in the situation where
the competition is between the wife's children by a first marriage and the children
of the marriage between the wife and the deceased husband. Since the children
of the first marriage are not blood relatives of the deceased spouse it seems at
first glance that these children should be barred. The better view, it is sub-
mitted, is to realize that the purpose of the widow's homestead is one of wel-
• fare ; therefore, it seems that these children should be entitled to one-half of the
proceeds of the widow's homestead.
33. Succession of Elliott v. Elliott, 31 La. Ann. 31 (1879).
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that its allowance in this situation would further the lawmakers'
motive.
In considering the third question the courts appear to have
extended the language of the statute and allowed minor grand-
children to claim the privilege from their grandfather's succes-
sion when the grandmother died without claiming it.34 This
view seems to be based on a broad interpretation of the word
"children" as used in that part of the statute providing that at
the death of the widow-usufructuary the money belongs to the
children or other descendants. Allowing minor grandchildren
to take the fund seems unsound as it presupposes the widow's
homestead is transmissible, and further it interferes with the
devolution of succession property by preferring more remote
descendants over those in a closer degree to the deceased. The
courts have long held that the widow's homestead is only a per-
sonal right given the widow or minor children of the deceased
and that such right is not transmissible.3 5 Moreover, the possi-
bilities of uncertainty in land titles are magnified by the con-
tinued use of this interpretation, since the Louisiana Constitu-
tion 3  specifically exempts the widow's homestead from the
necessity of recordation; and while the prescriptive period is in
doubt, it appears that the action could be brought within ten
years from the death of the deceased.37 Therefore the property
of the succession would remain subject to potential claims of
minor grandchildren for ten years.
THE MARITAL FOURTH
Article 2382 provides that if either husband or wife die rich,
leaving the survivor in necessitous circumstances, the latter is
entitled to demand one-fourth of the deceased spouse's succes-
sion. The redactors seem to have contemplated that this portion
be taken from the legitime of the children. The article provides
34. See Succession of Vives, 35 La. Ann. 371 (1883) ; Succession of Durkin,
30 La. Ann. 669 (1878).
35. Succession of Tugwell, 43 La. Ann. 879, 9 So. 499 (1899); Succession
of Geisler, 32 La. Ann. 1289 (1880).
36. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 19: "No mortgage or privilege on immovable
property, or debt for which preference may be granted by law, shall affect third
persons unless recorded or registered in the parish where the property is situated,
in the manner and within the time prescribed by law, except . . . privileges
ari.sing upon the death of the owner of the property affected ...... (Emphasis
added.)
37. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3544 (1870) : "In general, all personal actions, ex-
,,cept those before enumerated, are prescribed by ten years." A prescriptive period
for the widow's homestead action is not enumerated elsewhere.
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that if there be no children the fourth is awarded in full owner-
ship; however, if there be children the survivor only takes the
fourth in usufruct, with the further qualification that if there
are more than three children the survivor's fourth is reduced to
a child's portion in usufruct.
3
The tenor of article 2382 indicates that the basic purpose is
to maintain the surviving spouse in the same style which had
been enjoyed during the marriage.8 9 The purpose requires that
the surviving spouse be allowed to take the marital fourth not-
withstanding the adverse disposition of the testator's property.
40
This concept originated in the twenty-second Novelle of Jus-
tinian which provided that a rich man who divorced a wife
without dowry had to pay her a sum equal to one-fourth of his
estate.41 The wife who was at fault in causing a separation was
required to pay the same penalty. Later in the fifty-sixth No-
velle the law was extended to encompass either spouse in neces-
sitous circumstances upon the death of the rich spouse.42 In the
one hundred and seventeenth Novelle restrictions were placed
upon the giving of this bounty, including elimination of the
husband's right to the fourth if his wife divorced him. 43 The
French commentator, Merlin, concluded that this Novelle also
meant that the husband could not obtain the portion from his
wife's estate even when the marriage was dissolved by the wife's
death.44 The early written law of France, however, refused to
follow this interpretation.
4 5
When the fifty-sixth Novelle is read in conjunction with the
one hundred and seventeenth Novelle the basic characteristics
of article 2382 are discernible. 46 That our article is little more
38. This article is not subject to the restrictions of Civil Code article 1710,
that the legitime may not be burdened, since this burden is created by opera-
tion of law. See Succession of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888). There
is no jurisprudence, however, stating that the marital fourth must be taken from
the legitime.
39. Succession of Justus, 44 La. Ann. 721, 11 So. 95 (1892); Pickens v.
Gillam, 43 La. Ann. 350, 8 So. 928 (1891) ; Armstrong v. Steeber, 3 La. Ann.
713 (1848) ; Succession of Fortier, 3 La. Ann. 104 (1848).
40. Cf. Malone v. Cannon, 215 La. 939, 41 So. 2d 837 (1949) ; Veillon v.
Lafleur's Estate, 162 La. 214, 110 So. 326 (1926).
41. JUSTINIAN, NOVELLEs 22.6.
42. Id. 56.4.
43. Id. 117.5.
44. MERLIN, REPERTOIRE DE JURISPRUDENCE 445 (1813).
45. Ibid.
46. JUSTINIAN, NOVELLE 53.6 (Scott's transl. 1932) : "As every law enacted
by Us is based upon clemency, and We see that when men married to women
who have brought no dowry die, the children alone are legally called to the
[Vol. XXV
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than a revision of these two Novelles is a plausible conclusion
in light of other facts: namely, that there is no corresponding
article in either the Projet to the French Code or the Code Civil;
succession of their father's estates, while their widows, even though they may
remain in the condition of lawful wives, for the reason that they have not brought
any dowry, and no ante-nuptial donation has been given them, can obtain nothing
from the estates of their deceased husbands, and are compelled to live in the
greatest poverty, We wish to provide for their maintenance by enabling them to
succeed to them, and be called to share their estate conjointly with the children.
But as We have already enacted a law which provides that when a husband
divorces his wife, whom he married without any dowry, she shall receive the
fourth of his estate, just as in the present instance, whether there are few or
many children, the wife shall be entitled to the fourth of the property of the
deceased, if, however, a husband has left a legacy to his wife and this legacy
amounts to less than a fourth of his estate, this amount shall be made up out
of the same. Hence, as we come to the relief of women who have not been
endowed or divorced by their husbands, so We assist them where they have con-
stantly lived with them, and We grant them the same privilege.
"Again, everything that We have stated in the present law with reference
to the fourth to which a poor woman is entitled shall equally apply to a hus-
band, for like the former one, We make this law applicable to both.
"(1) But if the woman has property of her own in the house of her husband,
or situated elsewhere, she will have the right to retain said property, and it
shall not, under any circumstances, be subject to hypothecation for the benefit
of the creditors of her husband; unless he is the heir of his wife to the amount
established by the present law.
"(2) We enact these provisions as applicable in cases where either of the
two married persons has not brought either a dowry or an ante-nuptial donation,
and the survivor is poor, or the deceased was rich. For if the survivor has prop-
erty elsewhere, it would be unjust when, having neither brought any dowry nor
ante-nuptial donation, he or she should oppress the children by sharing the estate
with them; and as another of Our laws provides that a wife who does not bring
any dowry cannot, by means of an ante-nuptial donation, acquire any property
from her husband, We desire that this rule shall continue to remain in force,
establishing, however, an exception to it where a husband has bequeathed a
legacy, or some other share of his estate to his wife; for We by no means wish
to prevent this, in order that the laws may, in every respect, be consistent with
one another and that the poverty of one spouse may be compensated by the
wealth of the other."
Id. 117.5: "We some time since enacted a law providing that where a man
married a woman solely through nuptial affection, without any dowry, and he
afterwards divorces her without any cause recognized by the law, she shall be
entitled to the fourth part of the property of her husband; and after this law
We promulgated another, by which it is provided that if any should marry a
wife without a dowry, having been induced to do so by mere affection, and lives
all his life with her, and dies before she does, she, also shall be entitled to the
fourth of his estate, provided that the said fourth does not exceed the value of
a hundred pounds of gold. We, however, at present displaying more sagacity,
do hereby decree that children born of marriages due to mere affection shall,
under these circumstances, be deemed legitimate, and be called to the succession
of their father's estates; and that in each of these instances the wife shall receive
the fourth of her husband's property where he only had three children by her, or
by a preceding marriage; but if he had more than that, the wife shall then be
entitled to the usufruct of the share of the property she receives, and the owner-
ship of the same shall be reserved for the children whom she has had by this
marriage; but where such a woman has not had any children by her husband,
We decree that she shall acquire the ownership of the said property.
"We desire that a woman who was put away without good cause shall receive
the portion established by this law at the very moment of repudiation; but,
under similar circumstances, We absolutely forbid the husband to obtain the
fourth part of the estate of his wife in accordance with Our former law."
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that the corresponding Spanish law47 did not embody all the
characteristics of our article; and that Roman authorities were
available to the redactors of our Code.4 Therefore, it seems the
Louisiana courts should look beyond the Spanish or early
French law for the true meaning and purpose of our article.
Heritability of the Marital Fourth
The early Louisiana decisions, incorrectly relying on the
Spanish law, classified the right to the marital fourth as heri-
table.49 In Succession of Justus,5" however, the court, relying on
decisions involving the widow's homestead, 51 held that the right
to the marital fourth was not heritable but a purely personal
right which remained inchoate until accepted; if not accepted,
it lapsed. 52 The court distinguished the prior decision, Succes-
sion of Piffet,53 which had allowed inheritance of the right since
there the surviving spouse had judicially demanded the marital
portion prior to her death. The court reasoned that once the
47. 2 MOREAU & CARLETON, PARTIDAS pt. 6, tit. 13, L. 7 (1820) : "Men are
sometimes content to marry women who are poor and without a dowry; it is
therefore but just and proper, that since they loved and honored them through
life, they should not leave them destitute at their death. The ancient sages have
therefore thought fit to ordain, that if the husband should not leave the such
wife, the means of living independently (bien, e honestamente), and she should
not possess them herself, then she may inherit one fourth of the estate, notwith-
standing he should leave children: but such fourth part, ought not to exceed one
hundred pounds of gold, however great may be the estate of the deceased. (a) But
if such wife should possess in her own right, the means of living decently
(honestamente), then she will not have any claim to the estate of the deceased,
on account of such fourth part."
48. Franklin, Libraries of Edward Livingston and of Moreau Lislet, 15 TUL.
L. REV. 401 (1941). See also 2 MOREAU & CARLETON, PARTIDAS 1096 (1820),
which is further indication of the prominent role that Roman law has had in
influencing the redactors.
49. Succession of Piffet, 39 La. Ann. 556, 2 So. 210 (1887) ; Connor's Widow
v. Administrator and Heirs of Connor, 10 La. Ann. 440 (1855) ; Dunbar v.
Dunbar, 5 La. Ann. 158 (1850) ; Abercrombie v. Caffray, 3 Mart.(N.S.) 1
(La. 1824).
50. 44 La. Ann. 721, 11 So. 95 (1892).
51. Succession of Durkin, 30 La. Ann. 669 (1878) ; Succession of Robertson,
28 La. Ann. 832 (1876).
52. Succession of Justus, 44 La. Ann. 721, 724, 11 So. 95, 96 (1892) : "The
right conferred by the article is in the nature of a charity or bounty in favor
of the surviving consort left in penurious circumstances, which, to vest in him
or her, must, at least, have been claimed, when it could have been done. It is a
personal and optional right which remains inchoate until accepted, and which
lapses and dies away, and does not pass to the heirs of the survivor at his death,
when not previously accepted by him or her." Accord, Succession of Bancker,
154 La. 77, 97 So. 321 (1923) ; Succession of Kunemann, 115 La. 604, 39 So.
702 (1905) ; Dupuy v. Dupuy, 52 La. Ann. 869, 27 So. 287 (1899) ; Lasseigne
v. Lieche, Tessier's Digest No. 7459 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1919).
53. 39 La. Ann. 556, 2 So. 210 (1887).
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right had been judicially demanded it became vested and thus
transmissible.
It appears that, although the Justus case's reliance on the
widow's homestead decisions was unsound, its determination
that the right to the marital fourth is not heritable is correct.'
If the purpose of the marital fourth is to maintain the surviving
spouse, then it seems that the right allowed is solely for the
gratification of the surviving spouse, that is, a personal right,
and that it should produce no direct benefit to the survivor's
heirs.5 5 Therefore, the decision in Succession of Piffet is ques-
tionable, since the death of the surviving spouse should termi-
nate the right to the marital fourth whether or not the right has
been demanded prior to death.
Fault on the Part of the Surviving Spouse - A Bar to Recovery
A literal reading of article 23826 indicates that the surviv-
ing spouse could claim the marital fourth regardless of the
length or stability of the relationship existing between the two
spouses during their marriage. The early cases, however, con-
sidering that the purpose of the marital fourth was to maintain
the surviving spouse in the same manner as that enjoyed during
the marriage, read into the article the requirement that there
must have been a sufficiently lengthy period of cohabitation
during the marriage57 to allow a common enjoyment of wealth.5 8
Later the court repudiated the common enjoyment theory
and substituted the fault theory.5 9 Under this theory there was
54. Ibid.; Pickens v. Gillam, 43 La. Ann. 350, 8 So. 928 (1891) ; Armstrong
v. Steeber, 3 La. Ann. 713 (1848); Succession of Fortier, 3 La. Ann. 104
(1848).
55. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2000-2001 (1870) ; LA. CODE OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE art. 422 (1960).
56. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2382 (1870). See note 3 supra.
57. See, e.g., Succession of Fortier, 3 La. Ann. 104 (1848).
58. Succession of Rogge, 50 La. Ann. 1220, 23 So. 933 (1898) ; Pickens v.
Gillam, 43 La. Ann. 350, 352, 8 So. 9)28, 929 (1891) ; Armstrong v. Steeber, 3
La. Ann. 713 (1848).
59. Pickens v. Gillam, 43 La. Ann. 350, 352, 8 So. 928, 929 (1891) : "It is
proper to consider the effect to be given to separation, and the evidence with
reference to absence. Protracted absence may be considered with other facts.
A husband's desertion can be shown by a variety of circumstances; as for
instance, his departure with the avowed intent never to return; his prolonged
absence without business detention, or without providing, in the least, for his
family, although not entirely without ability so to do. The abiding together of
married persons implies that the husband shall select the place of dwelling, and
that in case of difference in this respect his will shall prevail. Civil Code,
art. 120. He left the place where they were married."
In Gee v. Thompson, 11 La. Ann. 657 (1856), the court gave the marital
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no requirement that the spouses must have lived together for a
lengthy period but simply a proviso that if the spouses separ-
ated prior to the death of one of the partners then the surviv-
ing spouse must prove that the separation was not due to his
fault.6 0 Though later cases rejected this theory and substituted
a literal interpretation of the article"1 the fault doctrine was
revived and approved in Malone v. Cannon 2 and is now the
present law.
Two serious objections have been made to the reintroduction
of the fault theory: first, determination of fault causes great
administrative difficulties for the courts; second, the theory in
effect forces the court to render a post mortem divorce decree.68
But these objections, on consideration, are not as serious as they
might seem. The administrative problem will be greatly reduced
if the courts adopt the well-recognized definition of fault used
in divorce cases. 4 The other objection, that the doctrine re-
quires a post mortem divorce, is not so easily dismissed. It has
been argued that the wronged spouse has the action of divorce
available if the other is believed at fault; it is up to the wronged
spouse to judge his own feelings and act accordingly.65 It is
submitted that the better view is to realize that the law permits
one to seek a divorce but does not require one to do so. Further,
the wronged spouse may object to divorce in principle.6 6 The
fourth to the wife even though the wife was judicially separated from the hus-
band prior to his death. The evidence established that the deceased husband had
driven his wife from the family domicile. The court felt that now to deny her the
marital fourth would be to penalize her for her husband's misconduct.
60. See note 59 supra.
61. See Veillon v. Lafleur's Estate, 162 La. 214, 222, 110 So. 326, 329
(1926), where the court stated: "Our own conclusion is that the law invoked
by the plaintiffs is clear and explicit. It attaches no qualifications and imposed
no conditions upon the necessitous wife who seeks to avail herself of its bene-
ficial provisions. It makes no distinction between the faithful wife and the un-
faithful wife." Accord, Succession of Hagan, 150 La. 934, 91 So. 303 (1922)
Succession of Guillon, 150 La. 587, 91 So. 53 (1922).
62. 215 La. 939, 41 So. 2d 837 (1949).
63. Note, 10 LA. L. REV. 257, 263 (1950).
64. "Fault" as defined in Felger v. Doty, 217 La. 365, 369, 46 So. 2d 300,
301 (1950), "contemplates conduct or substantial acts of commission or omission
on the part of the wife, violative of her marital duties and responsibilities, which
constitute a contributing or a proximate cause of the separation and continuous
living apart, the ground for the divorce." This definition has been accepted into
the jurisprudence of* our state. Rogers v. Rogers, 239 La. 877, 120 So. 2d 462
(1960) ; Vinot v. Vinot, 239 La. 587, 119 So. 2d 474 (1960) ; Davieson v. Trapp,
223 La. 776, 66 So. 2d 804 (1953); Richard v. Garth, 223 La. 117, 65 So. 2d
109 (1953) ; Chapman v. Chapman, 130 So. 2d 811 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
65. See Veillon v. Lafleur's Estate, 162 La. 214, 222, 110 So. 326, 329
(1926) : "The husband, who is the sole judge of his feelings and of his honor,
is the one to do this by taking appropriate legal action to sever the matrimonial
tie if he is dissatisfied therewith."
66. See Malone v. Cannon, 215 La. 939, 964, 41 So. 2d 837, 845 (1949).
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use, therefore, of the fault theory serves to respect the wishes
of a spouse with regard to divorce and still denies the erring
spouse the marital fourth.
Necessitous Circumstances and Dying Rich
Two conditions precedent to recovery of the marital portion
are that the deceased spouse die "rich" and that the survivor
be in "necessitous circumstances." These conditions are rela-
tive ;67 their fulfillment requires a comparison of the assets of
the deceased with those of the survivor.6 8 When this comparison
has shown a ratio of five to one, the courts have generally
awarded the marital fourth. However, where the ratio was four
to one, the marital portion has been denied, seemingly on the
theory that here the surviving spouse already has assets equal to
those which would be awarded by the terms of the article, if the
survivor were wholly destitute.
69
Only two cases are at variance with the general scheme out-
lined above. Both decisions are based on a comparison of the
property of the children of the parties with that of the sur-
viving spouse.70 As the same comparison of property is used to
determine entitlement to the widow's homestead 7' it seems that
one case is based on the now repudiated notion that the two
articles should be read in pari materia, and the other, an earlier
case, is simply unsound. 72 It is submitted that the two cases are
not to be followed.
In determining the wealth of the respective spouses the
courts have refused to consider the future earning capacity of
67. Malone v. Cannon, 215 La. 939, 41 So. 2d 837 (1949) ; Smith v. Smith,
43 La. Ann. 1140, 10 So. 248 (1891); Succession of Leppleman, 30 La. Ann.
468 (1878); Harrell v. Harrell, 17 La. 374 (1841) ; Moore v. Succession of
Moore, 7 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) ; Wimprenne v. Jouty, 12 La. App:
326, 125 So. 154 (Orl. Cir. 1929).
68. See, e.g., Succession of Morris, 137 La. 719, 69 So. 151 (1915) ; Crockett
v. Madison, 118 La. 728, 43 So. 388 (1907) ; Melancon's Widow v. His Execu-
tor, 6 La. 105 (1833).
69. See Comment, 2 LOYOLA L. REV. 58, 70 (1943) ; cf. Comment, 18 TUL. L.
REv. 290, 302 (1944).
70. Mason v. Mason's Widow & Heirs, 12 La. 589 (1838) ; Succession of
Derouen, 10 La. Ann. 675 (1855).
71. E.g., Succession of Vives, 35 La. Ann. 371 (1883) ; Succession of Durkin,
30 La. Ann. 669 (1878).
72. Succession of Derouen, 10 La. Ann. 675 (1855) seems based on the theory
that the marital fourth and the widow's homestead statutes are in pari materia.
Mason v. Mason's Widow & Heirs, 12 La. 589 (1838), decided before adoption
of the widow's homestead statute, is an aberration without other support in the
jurisprudence.
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the surviving spouse, 73 as well as the support grown children
might give. 74 In Succession of Leppleman,75 however, the court
stated obiter that a wife who had a, rich father could not claim
the marital fourth. 7  This dictum is supported by early French
and Spanish commentators, 77 and further authority may be
found in articles 22778 and 22979 of the Louisiana Civil Code
on the obligations of support between parent and child.80 It
seems, however, that a denial of the marital fourth on the
grounds that the survivor has a rich parent would subject the
future of the surviving spouse to chance, a situation presumably
not intended by the redactors.
Time of Determining Necessitous Circumstances
In Connor's Widow v. Administrator & Heirs of Connor8l
the heirs contended that the widow should be denied the marital
portion because she had become affluent since the suit was
filed. The court reasoned that the language of the article, "if
either the husband or wife die rich, leaving the survivor in
necessitous circumstances, ' 8 2 and the general policy of the law
which forbade leaving rights in abeyance or dependent upon
73. Succession of Fortier, 3 La. Ann. 104, 105 (1848), in which the Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court holding that a young
man who only possessed two slaves was in necessitous circumstances when the
deceased spouse's estate was in excess of $26,000. The court stated: "The object
of the law is to provide a support out of the property of the deceased without
reference to the ability of the survivor to support himself by his industry or
personal exertions alone."
74. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 52 La. Ann. 869, 27 So. 287 (1899). This decision, it
is submitted, accords with the purpose behind the marital fourth, since to con-
sider earning capacity and support is to consider contingencies that might not
be fulfilled. Accord, 1 FERRERO, LIBRERIA DE ESCRIBANO 201 (1789-90).
75. 30 La. Ann. 468 (1878).
76. Examination of this case shows that the true basis for denial was lack
of necessitous circumstances, since the succession was worth $8,000, while the
surviving wife had property in excess of $2400. Id. at 470.
77. See 1 FEBRERO, LIBRERIA DE ESCRIBANO 202 (1789-90) ; MERLIN, REPER-
TOIRE DE JURISPRUDENCE 445 (1813).
78. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 227 (1870) : "Fathers and mothers, by the very act
of marrying, contract together the obligation of supporting, maintaining, and
educating their children."
79. Id. art. 229: "Children are 'bound to maintain their father and mother
and other ascendants, who are in need; and the relatives in the direct ascending
line are likewise bound to maintain their needy descendants, this obligation being
reciprocal.
. "They are also bound to render reciprocally all the services which their
situation can require, if they should become insane."
80. See also Tolley v. Karcher, 196 La. 685, 200 So. 4 (1941) ; Elchinger v.
Elchinger, 135 So.2d 347 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) ; St. Vincent v. Sanford,
Gunby's Dec. (La. App. 2d Cir. 1885). For a more extensive discussion of this
area see Note, 22 LA. L. REV. 848 (1962).
81. 10 La. Ann. 440 (1855).
82. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2382 (1870). See note 3 supra.
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future accident, contemplated that the time of the death should
be the point at which to determine whether the survivor is in
necessitous "circumstances.83  The court, however, overlooked
that the language upon which it relied was a mistranslation
of the French text of article 55, page 335, of the Louisiana
Code of 1808.84 The English translation should read: "if either
the husband or wife die rich, and if the survivor be in neces-
sitous circumstances." This translation suggests two possible
determining points: the time of death and the time suit is filed.
The question which time is the more desirable must be weighed
by balancing the purpose of the marital fourth and the factor
of court administration. The first impression that time of filing
suit is the proper point is strengthened by the consideration
that in circumstances such as those in Connor the court could
deny the marital portion, and that if the circumstances were
such that the widow had suffered heavy financial reverses prior
to filing suit she could recover the marital portion. This view
is in accord with that taken by the early French commentators85
and is consonant with the purpose behind the marital fourth.
On the other hand, the Connor rule may be necessary to
obtain satisfactory judicial administration of the marital fourth.
If necessitous circumstances are always determined with ref-
erence to conditions existing at the moment death dissolved
the marriage, the court has a readily ascertainable measuring
point. While the moment of filing suit would be an equally
ascertainable measuring point, it seems debatable that the court
should be required to ignore the financial condition of the
claimant between death and the filing of suit. 6 Further, if the
moment of filing suit is used the surviving spouse has an op-
portunity to speculate with his present funds; if he loses then
he may recoup his losses, at least in part, by claiming the
83. 10 La. Ann. 440, 451 (1855).
84. The French test of article 55, p. 335, of the Louisiana Code of 1808 is as
follows: "[S]i le premier mourant des deux 6poux, et que le survivant soit dano
i ndcessitd. . . ." 3 LouiSIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITION OF THE
CIVL CODES OF LOUISIANA 1308-09 (1942).
85. MERLIN, RtlPERTOIRE DE JURISPRUDENCE 445-46 (1913) ; 1 LEBRUN, TRAT
DES SUCCEsSIONS 131 (1775).
86. If there has been an appreciable amount of time between death and the
time of filing suit, it seems that the argument will surely be made that the
court should consider this interval in determining whether the surviving spouse is
truly in necessitous circumstances. The court would then be faced with admin-
istrative difficulties which are not necessary under the Connor rule.
It is submitted that, if it should become desirable to fix the time of filing
suit as the proper measuring point, a consideration should be made of the de-
sirability of placing a short prescriptive period on the right to bring the action.
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'marital fourth. The Connor rule, however, eliminates the
manipulation of assets prior to claiming the marital fourth and
frees the court from the necessity of scrutinizing the claimant's
business transactions for fraud on the law.
Deductions from the Marital Fourth
The express language of article 238287 provides that the
marital fourth is to be taken from the deceased's succession
and that any legacies from the decedent to the surviving spouse
must be deducted from the marital fourth.88 The term "legacy"
connotes a donation made by last will and testament." The
Louisiana jurisprudence, however, in an attempt to prevent
the surviving spouse from receiving a greater portion of the
decedent's succession than that received by the heirs has allowed
deductions from the marital fourth that cannot fit within the
normal definition of legacy.9 The most notable are those de-
ducting the proceeds of an insurance policy payable to the wife
as beneficiary,91 the separate property of the surviving spouse,
92
and the value of the survivor's share of the community23
87. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2382 (1870). See note 3 supra.
88. Ibid.; accord, Succession of Morris, 137 La. 719, 69 So. 151 (1915);
Dupuy v. Dupuy, 52 La. Ann. 869, 27 So. 287 (1899); Succession of Piffet,
39 La. Ann. 556, 2 So. 210 (1887) ; Succession of Derouen, 10 La. Ann. 675
(1853) ; Melancon's Widow v. His Executor, 6 La. 105 (1833).
89. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1605, 1606, 1612, 1625 (1870).
90. Succession of Morris, 137 La. 719, 69 So. 151 (1915) ; Dupuy v. Dupuy,
52 La. Ann. 869, 27 So. 287 (1899) ; Succession of Piffet, 39 La. Ann. 556,
2 So. 210 (1887).
91. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 52 La. Ann. 869, 875, 27 So. 287, 289 (1899). The
court, in reference to the contention that insurance proceeds were not a true
legacy, stated: "It is true that this amount was not a legacy in terms left by
the husband, and for that reason is not expressly referred to by the word 'legacy'
in the article of the Revised Civil Code (article 2382) ; nevertheless, it cannot
be overlooked that the amount was secured by the husband, who chose to make
his wife the beneficiary of a policy on his life. We think that the amount should
be considered in fixing the amount of the wife's marital fourth, and shall so
decree."
It is submitted that if the court feels some deduction is proper, since the
husband paid the premiums, then the value of the premiums, if paid from the
husband's separate estate or one-half the value of the premiums if paid with
community funds, would be more in line with the intention of the redactors.
This, however, is still not the proper solution.
92. See Succession of Morris, 137 La. 719, 69 So. 151 (1915), in which the
decedent's succession was worth $5025 and the property of surviving spouse
amounted to $900. Had there been no deduction for the separate property, the
amount of the marital portion would have been $1256 instead of only $356.
93. Succession of Derouen, 10 La. Ann. 675 (1855).
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While it seems that these items are properly considered in
determining whether a spouse is in necessitous circumstances,
they should not be deducted from the marital portion itself.
The deducation of a true legacy is proper since it comes from
the deceased's succession, as does the marital portion. Not to
allow the deduction of true legacies would indeed penalize the
heirs. No penalty, however, results from the above-mentioned
deductions, since those items never formed part of the succes-
sion of the deceased spouse.
A possible reason for the allowance of these deductions by
the courts may have been the mistaken view that the marital
fourth and widow's homestead are in pari materia and should
be interpreted alike as far as possible. The above deductions
would be proper under the widow's homestead, since its purpose
is only to keep the necessitous widow and minor children of
deceased from becoming wards of the state.94
The court has, however, refused to permit a deduction when
the deceased released the surviving spouse of a debt owing to
him95 and refused to consider deduction of the value of the
property the wife would receive as dower in common law juris-
dictions."6 These decisions, it is submitted, are proper, since
neither sum formed part of the deceased's succession, nor could
they be considered a true legacy.
CONCLUSION
It may be questioned whether the marital fourth and the
widow's homestead have any utility in the law of today. This
question is emphasized by considering the benefits afforded the
94. See note 13 supra, and accompanying text.
95. Succession of Piffet, 39 La. Ann. 556, 2 So. 210 (1887).
96. Foster v. Ferguson, 1 La. Ann. 262 (1846). The reason evidently is
that the bounty accorded by one state should not be annulled by the laws of this
state. Accord, Comment, 18 TUL. L. REV. 290, 304 (1944). "Dower," at common
law, is an estate to which a widow is entitled for the period of her life, in one-
third of the land of which her husband was seized in fee simple or fee tail, and
which the issue of the marriage, if any, might inherit. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROP-
ERTY 339 (3d ed. 1939). As dower is impressed upon immovable property which
the husband may have sold during the marriage, the court wisely chose not to
allow this as a deduction from the marital fourth, since this property would not
form part of the succession. Had the court chosen the opposite view, this would
have, in effect, deprived the widow of some of the benefits properly due her.
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surviving spouse by articles 91517 and 9161s of the Louisiana
Civil Code. By article 915 the surviving spouse inherits the
decedent's share of the community when the surviving spouse
leaves no ascendants or descendants. Article 916 provides that
the surviving spouse is entitled to usufruct of the deceased's
share of the community if the deceased has not disposed of it
adversely to the surviving spouse's interest and if there are no
children of the marriage. Consideration of these two articles
shows that the need for the marital fourth is slight. On the
other hand, the widow's homestead has some utility, since it
reaches the situation where the community is either very small
or insolvent. Its utility, however, is limited by the fact that it
only provides benefits up to one thousand dollars. It is sub-
mitted that this sum is not sufficient to maintain the widow
and minor children for any appreciable length of time, and this
limit should be raised to an amount which would provide secur-
ity for these persons until the machinery of the modern welfare
and social security programs could be set in motion.
Charles G. Gladney
97. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 915 (1870): "When either husband or wife shall
die, leaving neither a father nor mother nor desceiidants, and without having
disposed by last will and testament of his or her share of the community prop-
erty, such undisposed of share shall be inherited by the surviving spouse in full
ownership. In the event the deceased leave descendants, his or her share in the
community estate shall be inherited by such descendants in the manner provided
by law. Should the deceased leave no descendants, but a father and mother,
or either, then the share of the deceased in the community estate shall be divided
into two equal portions one of which shall go to the surviving spouse, who,
together with father or mother inheriting in the absence of descendants, as pro-
vided above, shall inherit as a legal heir by operation of law, and without the
necessity of compliance with the forms of law provided in this chapter for the
placing of irregular heirs in possession of the succession to which they are
called."
98. Id. art. 916: "In all cases, when the predeceased husband or wife shall
have left issue of the marriage with the survivor, and shall not have disposed
by last will and testament, of his or her share in the community property, the
survivor shall hold a usufruct, during his or her natural life, so much of the
share of the deceased in such community property as may be inherited by such
issue. This usufruct shall cease, however, whenever the survivor shall enter into
a second marriage."
